Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Prawa Własności Intelektualnej (ZNUJ PPWI) są kontynuacją serii Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Wynalazczości i Ochrony Własności Intelektualnej (ZNUJ PWiOWI), wydawanej od 1973 r.
Czasopismo jest kwartalnikiem. Od połowy 2008 r. jest wydawane przez Wolters Kluwer Polska SA i ukazuje się regularnie pod koniec ostatniego miesiąca danego kwartału. Na jego łamach są publikowane artykuły poświęcone problematyce prawa autorskiego i praw pokrewnych, prawa ochrony konkurencji oraz prawa informacyjnego – w aspekcie krajowym, a także międzynarodowym. Czasopismo jest dedykowane specjalistom z zakresu prawa własności intelektualnej, zarówno praktykom, jak i pracownikom naukowym.
Wolters Kluwer Sp. z o.o. to część międzynarodowego koncernu Wolters Kluwer, które jest z kolei jednym z największych (w skali globalnej) wydawnictw. To wiodąca firma w dostarczaniu publikacji specjalistycznych adresowanych między innymi do branży prawniczej, ekonomicznej, ochrony zdrowia, administracji publicznej i edukacji.
- Zdezorientowany prawnik o publicznym udostępnianiu utworów
- str. 5
- Trolling prawnoautorski (copyright trolling)
- str. 38
24th Annual Fordham Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference,31 March - 1 April 2016 New York City - Conference report
Zdezorientowany prawnik o publicznym udostępnianiu utworów
W artykule omówiono prawo publicznego udostępniania utworów (ale dotyczy on także przedmiotów praw pokrewnych). Opisano w nim przede wszystkim: a) kontrowersyjne ustalenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości (dalej jako TS) w tym zakresie oraz ich przyczyny, b) zasady implementacji odpowiednich dyrektyw do prawa polskiego w kształcie wyznaczonym przez wyroki TS oraz c) pożądane kierunki zmian prawa UE i prawa polskiego w analizowanej sferze.
Trolling prawnoautorski (copyright trolling)
Wskazanie dokładnego momentu narodzin trollingu prawnoautroskiego, szerzej znanego również jako copyright trolling, jest dużym wyzwaniem. To względnie nowy proceder,który zarówno jako zjawisko, jak i pojęcie pojawiał się i rozwijał stopniowo, przyjmując różne postaci wraz z rozwojem Internetu i internetowego piractwa. Na przełomie XX i XXI w. w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki rozgorzała dyskusja wokół sprawy A&M Records Inc. przeciwko Napster, która wprowadziła walkę z internetowym piractwem w nowy etap skierowany przeciwko użytkownikom końcowym sieci peer-to-peer. Do Polski ten trolling prawnoautorski dotarł z opóźnieniem, ponieważ dopiero w 2014 r. działania trolli prawnoautorskich stały się na tyle natarczywe, że przyciągnęły uwagę nie tylko mediów i internautów, lecz także stały się punktem wyjścia dla rozważań Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości, Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów czy Naczelnej Rady Adwokackiej. Trolling prawnoautorski jest zjawiskiem wieloaspektowym, łączącym w sobie nie tylko zagadnienia prawa autorskiego, cywilnego, karnego, lecz także zagadnienia związane z ochroną konsumentów oraz danych osobowych. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi fragment pracy magisterskiej, poświęconej kompleksowej analizie zjawiska trollingu prawnoautorskiego.
Recepcja wyroku TS w sprawie Usedsoft GmbH przeciwko Oracle w odniesieniu do utworów rozpowszechnianych w formie cyfrowej innych niż programy komputerowe
Wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości (dalej jako TS) z 3.07.2012 r. w sprawie Usedsoft GmbH przeciwko Oracle International Corporation traktowany był - bezpośrednio po jego wydaniu - jako zwiastun powstania wtórnego rynku egzemplarzy utworów rozpowszechnianych w formie cyfrowej. W literaturze przedmiotu oraz w publicystyce pojawiło się oczekiwanie, że orzecznictwo sądów krajowych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej będzie - podobnie jak TS w sprawie Usedsoft przeciwko Oracle w odniesieniu do programów komputerowych - odwoływać się do instytucji wyczerpania prawa autorskiego w tym celu, aby uzasadniać dalszy obrót cyfrowymi egzemplarzami różnych rodzajów utworów już wprowadzonych do obrotu za zgodą dysponenta praw autorskich. Tymczasem orzecznictwo pozostaje niejednolite, a liczba oraz jakość argumentów na rzecz stosowania konstrukcji wyczerpania prawa w odniesieniu do utworów wprowadzanych do obrotu w formie cyfrowej, innych niż programy komputerowe, odpowiadają liczbie i znaczeniu argumentów przeciwnych. W niniejszym artykule autorka podejmuje próbę klasyfikacji oraz krytycznej analizy tych argumentów na tle orzeczeń wydanych w dwóch sprawach przez sądy krajowe w Niemczech i Holandii.
Ghostwriting i pokrewne zjawiska nieprawidłowej atrybucji autorstwa w świetle polskiego prawa
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest charakterystyka pojęcia ghostwritingu oraz porównawcze przedstawienie pokrewnych mu zjawisk związanych z nieprawidłową atrybucją autorstwa. Poruszone zostały w nim takie zagadnienia, jak pojęcie autorstwa, prawo do autorstwa utworu i tematyka autorskich praw osobistych w świetle polskiej ustawy o prawie autorskim. Zarysowano podstawowe różnice w systemach prawa autorskiego krajów doktryny Common Law i prawa kontynentalnego, jak i poddano analizie wybór zagadnień powiązanych z przedmiotowym pojęciem. Krótko omówiono także prawne konsekwencje tworzenia prac dyplomowych na zlecenie. W podsumowaniu znajduje się próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy w polskim prawie autorskim może znaleźć się miejsce dla zjawiska, jakim jest ghostwriting.
Uwagi do nowelizacji postanowień art. 108 ustawy - Prawo własności przemysłowej dotyczących zgłoszenia wzorów przemysłowych
Dokonując w 2015 r. długo oczekiwanej nowelizacji ustawy - Prawo własności przemysłowej, ustawodawca część uwagi skierował na wzory przemysłowe. Choć wśród zmian wprowadzonych nowelą do tekstu rozdziału IV tej ustawy (zatytułowanego "Wzory przemysłowe i prawa z rejestracji wzorów przemysłowych") przede wszystkim zwracają uwagę obszerne przepisy dotyczące ochrony tzw. międzynarodowego wzoru przemysłowego (ar t. 1171 i n.), to wiodące znaczenie należy przypisać nadaniu nowej postaci kilku postanowieniom art. 108 p.w.p. i do nich głównie odnieść refleksje i oceny dotyczące ostatnich działań nowelizacyjnych. Postanowień zawartych w art. 108 p.w.p. dotyczą trzy ważne modyfikacje: uchylenie w ust. 1 pkt 3, dodanie nowego ustępu oznaczonego jako 21, wreszcie nadanie us t. 3 całkiem nowego brzmienia. Wszystkie one wspólnie miały prowadzić do zbliżenia wymogów zgłaszania wzorów w Polsce do wzorca przyjętego w regulacji unijnej. Warto się zatem nad nimi zatrzymać, aby podjąć próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy (i w jakim stopniu) cel ten można uznać obecnie za spełniony.
Nieszkodzące nowości ujawnienie wynalazku w wyniku oczywistego nadużycia
Od 1.12.2015 r. prawo polskie, podobnie jak Konwencja o udzielaniu patentów europejskich, przewiduje ochronę uprawnionego z prawa do uzyskania patentu przed utratą nowości wynalazku, gdy ujawnienie nastąpiło nie dawniej niż 6 miesięcy przed dokonaniem zgłoszenia i było wynikiem oczywistego nadużycia w stosunku do uprawnionego lub jego poprzednika prawnego. Prawodawca w tej niewątpliwie istotnej regulacji posługuje się zwrotami niedookreślonymi, wymagającymi ustalenia ich treści w drodze wykładni. Proponując kierunek interpretacji tego przepisu, autor uwzględnia doświadczenia Europejskiego Urzędu Patentowego (dalej jako EUP), a także państw obcych,w których prawie przewidziano tożsamą regulację.
The debate of new approach to substantive patent law (SPL)for emerging technology claimed inventions (ET CIs)thanks to their scientification
Software and its patent-(non)eligibility issues have been discussed by patent law jurisprudence and by legislators for decades: to patent or not to patent? During this discussion many legal, economic, and social pros and cons were raised. The software jurisprudence (including i.a. implemented business methods and non-tangible/immaterial/ model-based emerging technology claimed inventions (ET CIs)) influenced the semantics of substantive patent law (SPL) strongly. Case by case (from the Patent-Eligibility- Trilogy to the Alice and Bilski cases, being a part of six unanimous cases KSR,Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, Biosig, and Alice) the SPL semiotics has been developed. A new glance at patenting immaterial inventions demanded refined claim construction. This paper discusses primarily the story of the patent-eligibility of software which is a contribution to a discourse of patenting model-based ET CIs which was enabled by using the notion "inventive concepts" when testing them, which in turn in my opinion enables: 1) establishing - via the SPL's scientification viewed as the mathematical definition of all relevant SPL notions - for emerging technology claimed inventions the separation line between patent-eligibility and patent-non-eligibility; and 2) recognizing many logical interrelations between SPL notions.
Table of contents
- Confused lawyer's thoughts about communication to the public
- p. 5
- Copyright trolling
- p. 38
24th Annual Fordham Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference,31 March - 1 April 2016 New York City - Conference report
Confused lawyer's thoughts about communication to the public
1. In the case law of the Court of Justice (CJEU) concerning the right of communication of works to the public, one can observe two opposite trends. The first one is the broadening interpretation of this right in EU directives (this is how we should treat mainly the extension of this right to include providing a hyperlink to a protected work, offering works, providing hotel customers devices with films on DVDs) so that the harmonization covers the broadest possible scope of exploitation of the objects of exclusive rights, protecting the author's interests. The second trend involves narrowing down thus broadened right of communication of works to the public (e.g. using the conditions of 'new' public, the ability to use a work in accordance with its function, awareness, fault of the person providing a link to works unlawfully put on the Internet or accepting payments).
2. What underlies the CJEU broadening the scope of the right of communication to the public is mainly lack of harmonization of indirect infringement of copyright in the EU. In an attempt to cover also such acts with the directives, the CJEU 'squeezes' them into the notion of direct infringement of copyright, especially the right of communication to the public, under the pretext that this right should be understood broadly, due to the express wording of recital 23 of Directive 2001/29/EC. Such extended scope of the right of communication to the public of a protected work has, however,caused problems connected with the excessive protection thus established, whose effects would in particular restrain the desired functioning of the Internet. Due to the above, we see a clear narrowing down of the right of communication to the public. But the new criteria proposed to this end by the CJEU are not grounded in international conventions, EU directives or national statutes. Moreover, they are often contrary to the basic principles of copyright law.
3. The CJEU introduces conditions that have to be met if an act is to be deemed interference with the right of communication to the public and they are contrary to the general construct underlying author's economic rights. This concerns exclusive rights, which are a form of absolute subjective rights. The CJEU seems to treat those rights as if they were forms of prohibited acts, whose regulation resembles that of acts of unfair competition. It is the only way we can understand the need for individualised assessment of every action and attaching fundamental importance to the perpetrator's guilt. We can also perceive this construct as similar to the one adopted in case of liability for hosting other persons' works in Art. 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, but after all it only regulates exclusions of liability and not the issue when an exclusive right is infringed. In this context, a question appears why the same approach could not be adopted in case of other fields of exploitation of the work, e.g. reproduction of works or their introduction to trade.
4. Other problems are connected with the assumption the CJEU made in the Svensson case, namely that the norm of Directive 2001/29/EC is complete, meaning that it also determines the maximum permitted protection of the 'right of communication to the public'. This opinion, in combination with the requirements as to the work having been communicated to the public, introduced by the CJEU, means that not only do they have the nature of a correction in view of the excessively broad definition of this right, but also that the permitted scope of copyright protection in EU Member States is narrowed down. This concerns for instance the inadmissibility of copyright protection against 'non-public' communication of the work. The same doubts apply to the communicated works which cannot be used in accordance with their functions. Thus a question arises about the possibility of assuming liability (e.g. in damages) for aiding or inciting the communication of works to the public. Once indirect infringements of copyright are not covered by EU harmonization, it would seem that legal regulations cannot be challenged in the light of this right. But it obviously broadens the scope of protection of this right, which is a controversial move, because one can argue that these issues are beyond the scope of regulation of Directive 2001/29/EC, thus the Member States were given freedom to regulate them. Let us also notice that the same arguments that made the CJEU consider the 'right of communication to the public' a complete regulation are just as valid with regard to other rights regulated in Directive 2001/29/EC, as well as probably in other 'copyright directives', which would lead to the same conclusions about the completeness of protection with regard to other forms of exploitation of works, regulated in EU law. I do not question the axiological arguments for such an approach - vis-ŕ-vis the contemporary, often excessive,copyright protection, but one cannot ignore the doubts about the legal grounds for such restrictions established by the CJEU as to the scope of domestic copyright protection. Yet another problem concerns the efficiency of the prohibition of providing links, placed e.g. on a website. An argument for a negative answer is the CJEU view of the maximum protection of the right in question, set in Directive 2001/29/EC, but the inadmissibility of extending the construct of exhaustion of right to cover also the sphere of communicating works to the public leads to an opposite conclusion. This loop would remove treating hyperlinking as just an indirect copyright infringement.
5. A legislative intervention in the EU law is necessary. This is about introducing a new form of exclusion of service providers' liability for linking, following the example of provisions contained in the E-Commerce Directive, or perhaps also a general exclusion of liability for providing works through no fault of the person providing them or not for commercial purposes. However, the optimum solution would be to issue a directive concerning the issue of liability for indirect copyright infringements, taking into account such facts as whether the person contributing to exploitation of the work is aware of the unlawful dissemination of the work and whether his/her activity had much importance for the work's exploitation.
6. Faithful absorption by Polish courts of the right to communicate the work under Directive 2001/29/EC in the shape defined by the CJEU is very difficult if not altogether impossible. Whereas, theoretically,providing links to works can be treated as using them within the meaning of Art. 17 of the Polish Copyright Act (though in my view this is definitively mistaken), there are absolutely no grounds to include in the Community conforming interpretation any further necessary factors reconstructed by the CJEU in order to ascertain whether a certain act is an act of communicating works to the public. Let us remind that they include e.g. new public, the ability to use a work in accordance with its function, fault of the person providing links to works unlawfully put on the Internet or the perpetrator's full awareness that his/her act enables third parties to access the work. Theoretically,all those facts could be taken into account as part of the assessment based on Art. 5 of the Civil Code (CC), but this would certainly defy the aims and functions of the institution of abusing the law, even if a liberal approach is adopted to the possibility of creating general rules here. If we agree with the above conclusion, then until the Polish copyright law is appropriately amended it is impossible to fully implement in case law the directive-based right of communication to the public as determined by the CJEU. Hence in such situations courts should limit themselves to assume only indirect infringements of the right under Art. 422 CC. Courts should adopt this interpretation even if they consider that Community confirming interpretation of Polish law permits full 'absorption' of the right to communicate works to the public as defined by the CJEU. We should ask ourselves what a judge should do when faced with the following alternatives as to interpreting domestic law: either faithfully implement the directive, which will produce various adverse consequences, such as excessive protection of other author's rights or the need to break the rules of correct inference, or adopt a very similar interpretation, without such negative consequences, albeit 'losing' some of the elements of CJEU interpretation. In my view, the latter alternative is permissible: an implementation that is 'friendly' to the law of the implementing country. This means flexible absorption of the directive, consisting in a departure from absolute fidelity to CJEU interpretations, if it enables maintaining the existing legal constructs and well-rooted line of case law, while not running counter to the basic aims of EU regulations or threatening the correct operation of EU market.
7. Certain suggestions of amendments to the Polish copyright regulation also spring to mind. As the existing line of CJEU case law concerning communicating works to the public is maintained, it seems expedient to replace the synthetic determination of the substance of authors' economic rights (using the work) in Art. 17 of the Polish Copyright Act with an enumeration of the forms of actions (fields of exploitation) covered by author's exclusive rights, specified in international conventions and EU directives that bind Poland, in which enumeration the terminology from the directives should be used. This would facilitate the absorption of CJEU judgments. Moreover, I believe it would be expedient to introduce an appropriate differentiation of the existence and intensity of protection depending on whether or not exploitation of the work was culpable as well as to extend copyright protection under Art. 79 of the Polish Copyright Act to include not only direct use of the work, but also indirect copyright infringement or, more precisely, certain acts connected with the work (aid in getting access to it, offering it, etc.). Furthermore, I see no problem in extending the 'classic' copyright protection to include liability for providing links to works made available on the Internet (similarly to offering licences to the work without having the right to do so), yet subject to two important reservations. Firstly, such protection should be established not within 'communication to the public', but as another form of autonomous encroachment on an author's exclusive right, hence without the need to use the constructs adopted in Art. 422 CC. Secondly,to avoid 'stifling' the Internet, any protection in this respect should include a norm clarifying the additional conditions necessary to consider such an act unlawful and the wording of this norm should make use of CJEU case law relating to the necessary requirements for finding that works have been communicated to the public.
Copyright trolling is a relatively new phenomenon that arose as a side-effect from the fight against internet piracy. It is questionable in both legal and ethical respects. Copyright trolling is aimed at obtaining financial gains under the guise of copyright protection. The modus operandi of copyright troll consists in sending requests for payment to users of peer-to-peer systems due to alleged copyright infringement they committed by disseminating a work without the author's permission. Unfortunately,the aforementioned requests for payment, based on the threat 'pay or you will be sued', may be in certain cases issued by unauthorised entities or addressed to completely random recipients. Copyright trolling is a very complex issue, not only combining elements of copyright law, civil law, criminal law,consumer protection and personal data protection, but also additionally complicated by the particularities of peer-to-peer systems.
The article is an attempt to find a proper definition of copyright trolling and conduct a thorough analysis of legal aspects concerning its certain types. In order to do so, I introduce the first division of copyright trolling based on the parties' capacity to sue or be sued.
When there is no legal relationship (when the sender of the request for payment is an unauthorised entity or a recipient of a demand for payment is not an infringer, or both) I suggest to call this type of copyright trolling the direct one. An analysis of this type of trolling requires paying close attention to the institution of permitted private use in case of downloading files, fraud, the legal status of settlements based on a non-existent legal relationship and consumer protection. It is also necessary to examine the possibility of invoking unjust enrichment in cases when the recipient of the request for payment has already paid.
The other type of copyright trolling should be called indirect copyright trolling (when the sender of a request for payment is authorised and the recipient of a demand for payment is an infringer, but the law as such is being abused). In the section concerning this type of trolling I try to prove that despite the fact that copyright infringement indeed took place, the author abuses their right because of the methods they use. It should be born in mind that the constitutive feature of copyright trolling is its genuine aim, which is not copyright protection, but obtaining financial gains, therefore I try to defend the thesis that abuse of law is an inherent element of indirect copyright trolling. As an alternative to the abuse of law for the troll's victims, I indicate also the evasion of the legal effects of declaration of intent made under the influence of the threat.
The article is also oriented on indicating loopholes in the Polish legal system, which are conducive to copyright trolling as well as abuses of personal data and criminal proceedings. An important contribution to the fight against copyright trolling abroad was made by consumer organisations,therefore a whole section of this article is also dedicated to copyright trolling as a practice that is harmful to the collective interests of consumers. All of that serves to increase the awareness among the potential victims of copyright trolls and to attract the attention of authorities competent to introduce the necessary amendments.
In the light of the latest changes in the Polish legislation, especially concerning claims for copyright infringement, and the increasing awareness of the general public, it is to be hoped that copyright trolling will soon cease to be lucrative and effective.
Applicability of Usedsoft v. Oracle judgment to works disseminated in digital copies, other than computer programmes
This article analyses the consequences for the exhaustion doctrine in digital environment of the judgement issued by the Court of Justice (later referred to as CoJ) on 3 July 2012 in case C-128/11 (EU:C:2012:407) Usedsoft v. Oracle. This judgement fits in with the line of creative interpretations of EU law by CoJ. It applies the principle of exhaustion to the right of distribution of computer programs provided online (downloaded). Shortly after the judgement was rendered, the question that was put forward was how this judgement might apply to digital content other than software. Software falls under the regulation of Directive 2009/24/EC (the Computer Directive), while other type of content is excluded from the scope of the Computer Directive and falls within the scope of Directive 2001/29/EC (the InfoSoc Directive). The provisions of both Directives concerning the principle of exhaustion are slightly different.
The article indicates how the courts in the EU Member States tried to find answer to the question of applicability of the Usedsoft v. Oracle judgement to the other type of works, disseminated in the digital form. The practical impact of solving of the aforementioned problem cannot be overestimated. If the possibility of applying the Usedsoft v. Oracle judgement to content other than software were confirmed, the market of used content would be established.
The writer analyses two courts decisions - given by the Regional Court in Bielefeld (Germany) on 5 March 2013 and by the Regional Court in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) on 20 January 2015. The courts' reasoning in both cases is different. In the first case, the applicability of the Usedsoft v. Oracle judgement to content other than software was excluded. In the second case the court left the issue opened, saying that it would not be resolved in interim relief proceedings. However, the Regional Court of Amsterdam has pointed out that there are strong arguments for applicability of the Usedsoft v. Oracle judgement to content, other than software, disseminated in the digital form by downloading. In the article, the author presents a short overview of the arguments presented by both courts and supported by lawyers from different European countries. The first group of arguments is based on the recitals of the InfoSoc Directive (recital 29), which reads '[t]he question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the rightholder'. The author shows that the quoted fragment of the Directive is very uncertain. Firstly, it does not specify how 'on-line services' should be understood. The author believes they comprise only streaming, thus, they do not comprise downloading or ordering goods via the Internet. Streaming does not result in creating a copy of work on the user's computer, while downloading does. The second group of arguments is based on the differences in the wording of Art. 4(2) of both Directives. Art. 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive states that 'the distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent'. It refers to 'the object', while the Computer Directive does not. Consequently, some lawyers believe that the principle of exhaustion applies to copies of content other than software only if these copies are disseminated as tangible objects. The author tries to establish what a 'tangible object' means,assuming that it has different meaning than simply a material or existing object.
The third group of arguments deployed by the courts involves looking for a solution in the economic and functional equivalence of the traditional and digital markets. These arguments are supported by one of the basic EU principles: that of the common market.
The fourth group of arguments concentrate on the technological details of the downloading process. Downloading always requires multiplication of the work. When the user downloads a copy (or sends it via e-mail to a third party), in fact a new copy is created on the computer. The principle of exhaustion limits only the author's right to control distribution. It does not limit the author's exclusive multiplication right. Thus, the owner of the digital copy of work cannot simply disseminate this copy via downloading or sending e-mails, because dissemination is always connected with multiplication. Art. 5(1) of the Computer Directive forms a legal basis for multiplying computer program copies. The InfoSoc Directive does not comprise an equivalent provision. In the author's opinion it is the strongest argument against applicability of the Usedsoft v. Oracle judgement to content other than software. The author assumes that a multitude of arguments - although justified on the legal grounds - leads to uncertainty. At least a resolution of the issue given by the CoJ in subsequent judgements is desirable and should clarify situation.
Ghostwriting and related phenomena of misattribution of authorship in the light of the Polish law
This paper opens with a short introduction, in which I attempt to present a historical outline of the phenomenon of misattribution of authorship over a few centuries. Then the reader is given the necessary definitions of the notions of 'ghostwriting' and 'ghostwriter', as well as a resume of the basic differences between copyright in common law countries and in civil law countries: from the kind of conception of author's moral and economic rights in both these systems to the fundamental differences in the legal systems' approaches to the citizen and to the issue of freedom of contract. Subsequently,an attempt is made to place the phenomenon of ghostwriting in the conditions dictated by the Polish Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, that is, in particular in the light of the prohibition of transferring author's moral rights, which is expressed in Art. 16 of the abovementioned statute. A short piece of the paper is also devoted to a brief presentation of the problem of translation as a work which may be an example of ghostwriting. When touching upon the issue of 'creating works upon order' in the Polish practice, attention should undoubtedly be drawn attention to a variation of the phenomenon, namely speechwriting, which is accepted by legal scholars. This exception is discussed in another section of this work. Another part introduces the institution of guest authorship and - to a limited extent - the issue of co-authorship of a work, as well as conditions that have to be met in order for a person to be recognized as a co-author. A separate section of this paper attempts to draw the boundary between the work of a proof-reader or editor of a literary text and the activities of a ghostwriter, which boils down to defining the cooperation of a person who edits the text as not having a creative character, but only an auxiliary one. Further in the work, I present some theoretical reflections about how a ghostwriting contract should look or how it looks in practice. In yet another section, I try to briefly describe the legal effects of the offence of misleading as to authorship, which ghostwriting is, for the person ordering the creation of the work and for the ghostwriter, while section 3 contains a part devoted to the prevalence of the phenomenon in question in the academia. Next,the paper concisely discusses examples of phenomena related to ghostwriting, such as plagiarism or the so-called fan fiction.
The summary contains an attempt at answering the question whether in the Polish law there may be room for a phenomenon like the Anglo-American ghostwriting. One cannot ignore the objections,which have been made in literature for a long time, that contemporary copyright law, especially in the area of author's moral rights, is poorly adjusted to the reality of the Internet era and the unavoidable depreciation of certain values. Yet, when reflecting on these issues, one should observe that due to the fundamental differences in the values that influenced common law and civil law orders it is mistaken to make references to the common law equivalents of Polish regulations. In common law, the copyright law system is based mainly on the protection of economic interests of the author, giving author's moral rights a marginal importance, while in civil law countries, thus also in the Polish copyright law, special importance is accorded to protecting the link between the creator and the work. For this reason, if ghostwriting is made an exception to the rule that author's moral rights are inalienable and non-transferable, enshrined in Art. 16 of the Polish Copyright Act, this cannot be called a natural evolution of the continental copyright law system, caused by adjustment to the current needs.
Comments about amendments to Art. 108 of the Act - Industrial Property Law concerning the notification of industrial designs
This article discusses important changes that took place in 2015 in the area of protecting industrial designs as a result of amendments to the Act - Industrial Property Law of 30 June 2000 (IPLA). The author places emphasis on the modified contents of Art. 108 IPLA, which establishes the kinds and hierarchy of documents required when industrial designs are notified in order to obtain rights under registration. She first draws attention to Art. 108(1)(3) IPLA, which repealed an earlier provision that required preparing - in addition to an application and illustration - a description explaining the illustration of an industrial design, indicating that this seemingly achieved conformity with the provisions of Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs and Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 on Community Designs.
But para. 3 of Art. 108 IPLA provides for a possibility (but no longer the requirement) of enclosing with the notification also a description explaining the illustration of an industrial design. Similarly, there were no amendments to para. 6 of Art. 108 IPLA, which makes recognition of the notification conditional upon whether it contains a part which appears to be a description. While reflecting on the reasons why things are so, the author finds that the situation is rather not a result of lack of diligence in editing the provisions,but most likely of difficulties with abandoning - in the work on amendments to the act - the patent model,traditionally applied in the Polish procedure of notifying industrial designs.
The author points out that as these provisions jointly form the contents of Art. 108 IPLA, they do not clearly determine the place of a description among the notification documents. Though they are closer to the EU regulation, they are still not fully aligned with it. Therefore the author makes a preliminary attempt at specifying the place of the description explaining the illustration among those documents,taking into account the contents of the provisions on industrial designs after the amendments. She also formulates preliminary proposals of what the law should be in this regard, pointing out the need to amend the Industrial Property Law Act and the implementing provisions.